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he National Labor Relations Board's
extension ofthe Weingarten^ decision,
granting the right to union representation at
pre-disciplinary interviews, to the nonunion
workplace was recently upheld by the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.- Section 7's,^'
protection of concerted activity and the symmetrical protection of union and nonunion employees alike renders the decision sensible and
supportable. Nevertheless, closer examination
ofthe decision's consequences suggests that the
application ofthe Weingarten right in the nonunion workplace results in a distorted reflection ofthe right's application in the unionized
workplace. The situations are not mirror images. Thus, some adjustments to the interpretation ofthe right in the nonunion workplace
are necessary to make it workable and effective.
SECTION 7 PROTECTIONS

Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act
guarantees employees the right to engage in
concerted activity for the purpose of mutual aid
and protection.^ An employee exercising Section 7 rights is shielded from adverse employer
actions, such as discipline or dischai'ge, as Section 8(a)(l) deems such retaliatoiy action an
unfair labor practice.' Because Section 7 protects both union activity and "other concerted
activity," groups of nonunion employees enjoy
the rights and protections of Section 7, so long
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as the activity to be afforded protection is for the
mutual aid and protection of tlie employees.^
WEINGARTEN

ITie Supreme Court, in NERB v. ]. Weingarten,
Inc.,^ affirmed the Board's holding that an employer commits an unfair labor practice under
Section 8(a)(l) when it denies an employee's request for the presence ofa union representative
at an investigatoiy meeting which the employee
reasonably believes may result in disciplinai")' action, l^he Weingarten right, accoixling to the Court,
originates in Section 7, and tbe exercise tliereof
constitutes "concerted activity for tiie pru-pose of
... mutual aid and protection."^ In affinning die
Board, the Court held tbat the Board's holding
was a peiTiiissible construction of Section 7 and
the rights and protections gtiaranteed therein.
Limitations

While recognizing the employee's right to the
presence of a union representative at an investigatory interview, the Court articulated four
limitations on that right. First, tbe Weingarten
rigbt arises "only in situations wliere the employee requests representation." •' Second, the
right is limited to "sittiations in which the employee possesses a reasonable belief that the
interview may result in disciplinaiy action."'"
Third, the employee's exercise of the
Weingarten. right may not "interfere with legitimate employer prerogatives."" Thus, the
employer may offer the employee the choice
of attending tbe intei"view unaccompanied, or
"foregoing any benefit" of an inten'iew while
the employer carries on the inqtiiry without
interviewing the employee.'- Finally, although
the employee has the rigbt to have a union
repi'esentative present, the employer has no
corollaiy obligation to bargain with such representative.'-^ The Board has since held, however, that the representative must be afforded
the opportunity to participate in the interview.'^ In the Board's view, the Court clearly
contemplated that the representative's role was
to provide assistance and counsel to the employee facing disciplinaiy action.
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Remedy

Reasoning that an employer shotild not be required to reinstate an employee even in the event
that the employee's WeingaHen rights arc violated,
the Board has held that the applicable remedy
for a WeingaHen violation is a cease and desist
order.'"* Ifthe employee is terminated for exercising the rigbt, however, rather than for the
underlying conduct that led to the investigation
in which the right was violated, reinstatement
and back pay are appropriate remedies."'
WEINCARTEN IN
NONUNION WORKPLACES
Pre-£pf/epsy Foundation cases

Weingarten involved represented employees.
Becatise the Board and the Court based the
Weingarten right upon the Section 7 statutory
protections afforded to both represented and
unrepresented employees, the Board was eventually faced with the difficult question of
whether the Weingarten rigbt is enjoyed by unrepresented employees as well.^^
The Board first addressed this question in
1982 in Materials Research,}'^ Concluding that
the benefits and protections ofthe Weingarten
right cotild be realized in the absence of a
union representative, the Board deterinined
that an unrepresented employee has the right
to request the assistance ofa fellow employee
in the situations contemplated in Weingarten.
By 1985, a change in Board membership resulted in a re-interpretation ofthe applicabilit)'
of Weingarten rights in the nonunion setting. In
Sears, Roebuck & Co., the Board determined that
it had misinterpreted Section 7 of the Act and
that, in the absence ofa recognized union, the
Act could not be interpreted to provide
Weingarten rights.''' Three years later, the Board
revisited the issue in E.F Du Pont de Netnours &
Co., changing its rationale but reaching the same
result.-" In Du Pont, the Board reasoned that
the Act did not mandate the conclusion that
nonunion employees have no WeingaHen rights,
but decided that die balance of interests between
nianagenient and labor favored denial of the
LABOR LAW JOURNAL

right because "many of the useful objectives
listed by the Court [in Weingarten] either are
much less likely to be achieved or are irrelevant"
in the nonunion setting."-'

tively to find the discharge of Borgs unlawftil.
In support of its decision, tbe Board noted that
there was no evidence in the record to suggest
that the employer was relying on the state of
Board law when it took action against Borg.
Epilepsy Foundation
Applying the lTile sen'ed to "correct effects of
Over ten years later, the Board revisited the
the imposition of discipline on an employee for
issue again, finding "compelling reasons" to
availing himself of the right to engage in proreverse the Du Pont decision. Epilepsy Founda- tected activity, and thus sewes the purpose of
tion of Northeast Ohio-- involved the termina- promoting the right of employees to engage in
tion of two employees. Both employees, Borgs
concerted activity for mutual aid and protecand Hasan, sent a menioranclum to their sution," said the Board.-"
pervisor stating that they no longer required
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Cireuit afhis supervision over their project and a subfirmed the Boairl's decision in November, 2001 .''^
sequent memo to an- —
• ————
— - Recognizing tliat it must
other officer of the
affirm the Board's interA REQUEST FOR A UNION
Foundation. Borgs was
pretation ofthe Act "unfired for refusing to
REPRESENTATIVE THAT DOES
less it conflicts with the
meet with employer
unambiguously exNOT CAUSE UNREASONABLE
representatives without
pressed intent of the
his coworker, Hasan,
DELAY SHOULD BE PROTECTED
Coiigi'ess or is otliei~wise
present.^'' Hasan met
not a permissible conA N D HONORED WHERE
with the employer
stiTiction ofthe statute,"
without representation
the D.C. Circuit upheld
ONE IS AVAILABLE, EVEN
and was terminated for
the Board's extension of
IF IT MAY NOT BE THE
insubordination arisWeingaHen rights to noning out of his drafting
union employees.^'' BeOFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF
and delivery of the
cause the Weingarten
THE EMPLOYEE.
meniorandum and
right was held to be an
subsequent refusal to ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ extension of Section 7,''"
sign performance evaluations.
the qtiestion of permissibility revolved around
Determining that the Weingarten right is en- whether the presence of a coworker at an invesjoyed by the unrepresented as well as tbe reptigatory intewiew which tlie nonunion employee
resented employee, and holding that Du Pont
reasonably believes may result in disciplinaiy
was inconsistent with the NLRA and the Suaction is concerted action for mutual aid and propreme Court's decision in Weingarten, the Board tection.'' 1 he court found no fault with the
overruled Du Pont and returned to the ratioBoard's recognition tliat nonunionized employnale of Matetials Research}'^ Thus, under Epi- ees share an interest in preventing unw^arranted
lepsy Foundation, an employee in a nonunion discipline. Thus, the Board's detemiination that
environment has the right to have a coworker
an employee's request for a coworker's presence
present at an investigatory interview that the
at an investigatoiy interview is concerted action
employee reasonably believes may result in disfor mutual aid and protection was reasonable.''ciplinaiy action.-^ The Epilepsy Foundation right 'Fhe court also agreed with the Board tbat supenjoyed by nonunion employees is similarly limport for the extension ofthe Weingarten right to
ited by the constraints enunciated by the Cotirt
nonunionized workplaces is found in the
in Weingarten .^^' Finding that application of the Weingarten decision itself •'•'
Weingarten rule would not work a manifest inWhile affirming the Board's extension of tbe
justice, the Board applied its decision retroacWeingatien right to nonunionized workplaces.
WEINGARTEN RIGHTS IN NONUNION SETTINGS
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the D.C. Circuit reversed the Board's retroactive application of its holding. In applying the
new rule retroactively, said the court, the Board
violated the governing principle that when a
new law is substituted for an old law that was
"reasonably clear," the new law may only have
prospective effect so as to "protect the settled
expectations of those who had relied on the
preexisting loile."-'^ The court noted that the
Board's policy regarding Weingarten's application was clear and unquestionable at tbe time
the dispute at issue arose—nonunionized employees did not enjoy the riglit.-^^ Considering
the clarity ofthe old nile, as well as the injustice of holding the Foundation liable for what
were lawflil actions when they were taken, the
court refiised to enforce the Board's decision
on retroactivity.
The final issue decided by the court was
whether the Board erred in determining that
the Foundation's discbarge of Hasan was unlawful because he was engaged in protected
concerted activity. Finding that Flasaii articulated no objection to any term or condition of
employment, but rather rejected supeiA-isory
authority and expressed his "feelings and opinions," the court deemed the drafting and delivery of the memorandum an act of insubordination rather than protected activity.^'^ The
court found no evidence to support a "nexus
between the...nieiiio and any protected activity by Hasan concerning the terms and conditions of his employment."'" Thus, his discharge was lawful.
THE FUNHOUSE MIRROR
The constraints ai'ticulated by the Supreme Court
in Weingarten, and in subsequent interpretations
of the right by die Board, were fonnulated for
situations involving a union-rep re sen ted employee. AVliile certain of these limitations are
easily transferred to the nonunion setting, others seem rather misplaced and diffictilt to apply
in the same manner as contemplated by the
Court in WeingaHen and by the Board. Although
there was a brief period when the Board applied
Weingarten to nonunion employees between the
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decision in Materials Research Corp. and its reversal three years later in Sears Roebuck, Co., none of
diese issues was addressed definitively by the
Board during that time period.
Representation by the union in a WeingaHen
interview involves assistance of a trained and
knowledgeable union representative, at least in
ideal circumstances. In a unionized workplace,
the union educates employees about tlieir rights,
including the Weingarten right. Tlie union has
an official role in the workplace and owes a duty
of fair representation to all employees. The absence of these factors in the nonunion workplace
does not make the representation right inapplicable, but it does necessitate consideration of
possible adjustments so that tlie right achieves
its purpose without unduly interfering with other
important interests in the workplace.
Reasonable belief regarding discipline
As stated above, tbe Weingaiten right is only applicable in situations in which the employee reasonably believes an investigatoiy interview may
result in disciplinaiy action. The determination
of reasonableness is not based on the employee's
good faith. Nor is it based upon the employee's
subjective mindset or the employer's subjective
intent. Rather, it is based upon a reasonableness
standard determined by the objective factors of
the situation.-'" Consider, for example, the
Boaixl's decision m Equitable Gas Co.'^^ The Board
there stated that it made no difference whether
or not tbe iiiteiA'iew actually resulted in disciplinaiy action. What was determinative of reasonableness was whether the "employee concerned
could reasonably anticipate discipline as a possible result.""^" In the Equitable Gas Co. situation,
the Board found an employer's previous statements indicating an intention to strictly follow
company guidelines adequate to cieate a reasonable fear of disciplinaiy action.^' Following the
Board's rationale, it would appear that any information the employee is piivy to, such as tlie
employer's history of executing disciplinary action, the employee's own histoiy of being disciplined, or previotis statements by the employer,
may provide evidence to satisfy the reasonable
basis test under Weingarten.

LABOR LAW JOURNAL

ceed with a representative present. Ifthe employei' denies re]presentation and proceeds without it, the cease and desist remedy is a small
price X.O pay. Only if die employer terminates
the employee for refi_ising to participate in the
inten'iew without I'epresentation is there risk
ofthe more substantial penalty of reinstatement
and back pay. The employer may always terEmployee request
minate the employee for the underlying misconduct if warranted. Where diere is no reThe Weingarten right arises only upon tbe
quirement of just cause for termination, the
employee's request for representation, and an
employer need only take care that the terniinaemployer has no duty to inform an employee of
Lion does nol run afoul of discrimination laws
the existence of such right. Tbe unrepresented
or tbe NLRAs prohibition on termination for
employee, generally less knowledgeable on tbe
engaging in imion or pi'otected concerted acapplicability ofthe N L l ^ and die protections
tivity. Moreover, notification would be consisaflbixied by the Act, will likely remain uninformed
as to the WeingaHen. right and will fail to exercise tent with the NLRB's move toward requiring
notification of employee rights in other conthe right when necessary for protection. In the
texts, such as the right to refrain from union
nonunion workplace, the right will most likely
membership and the right to object to expenbe asserted by unrepresented employees who are
ditures of union dues not germane to the union's
involved in a union oiganizing campaign and
representational duties.'have been informed by the union abotit the right.
The Bomxl could enhance die value ofthe right
Chosen representative
by requiring employer notice to employees, either generally through posting ofa workplace
Under Weingarten, the Board has held that if
notice, or at tbe time ofthe inten iew. WHiile the
the employee's chosen union representative is
Board has not traditionally required notice of
unavailable but another is able to attend, tbe
rights in the absence of a finding that an ememployee must proceed with the available repployer or union has violated the Act, many emresentative.^-' Does the employee in the nonployment law statutes enacted in more recent
union setting have the same obligation lo acyears require some affirmative notice to employcept the presence of any representative—any
ees of their rights. The likely assumption at the
coworker—who is available? Further, it retime the NLR\was passed, when the percentmains tmcertain as to whether or not the unage of union membership was much higher, was
repiesented employee may request the prestbat employees wotild be informed of their rights
ence ofa union official at an investigatory inby their unions. In the largely nonunion workterview before the union is selected as majorforce of today, such an assumption is unwarity representative, during an organizing camranted. Anotice requirement also would remove
paign for example, or where other employees
the risk to the employee who refused to particiin the facility have union representation.
pate in tlie interview without representation only
Weingarten made clear that the role of the
to find later, after discharge or discipline, diat
representative is greater than mere presence.
the Board deems the assessment that the interThe representative is to provide assistance and
view was likely to lead to discipline unreasoncounsel to the employee facing possible disciable, thereby rendering the refijsal unprotected.
plinaiy action. The denial of such assistance is
Even with the requirement of notice, tbe right
deemed a "serious violation of an employee's
would impose little restraint on managerial freeindividual right to mtitual aid and protection."^^
dom. The employer still retains the right to
Attempting to clarify the representative's lole,
forego the interview if it does notw'ish to prothe Board has stated that the purpose of the

This aspect of Weingarten seems readily
transferable to the nonunion setting. While
the absence of a union may limit the
employee's knowledge regarding the
employer's disciplinary history, any existing
knowledge will determine whether the
employee's belief was reasonable.

WEINGARTEN RIGHTS IN NONUNION SETTINGS
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representative is to provide the more "experienced assistance" that a tinioii steward may be
able to offer.'^'' The union representative may
clarify issues, bring otit the facts and policies at
issue in the intei-view, and provide assistance to
an employee who is unable to express herself^''
Considering the Court's holding that the
right contemplates more than the mere presence ofthe representative, and the Board's clarification ofthe possible roles ofthe representative, it may be argued that the unrepresented
employee may need a particular coworker who
lias the requisite knowledge and skill to provide the type of assistance contemplated by the
Court and the Board. Certainly, requiring an
employee to accept the "assistance" of a coworker who may not possess the knowledge and
skill necessary for the realization of the
Weingarten rigbt could be constiTied as a denial
of the right—a denial the Court held to be a
"serious violation."'^ Taking into account the
employer's interest in a prompt investigation,
however, an unreasonable delay to wait for the
best representative will not likely be required.
Since most coworkers would be unable to fulfill the role described by the Board in Southivestern Bell, an employee may find it necessary
to have the presence of a union representative
in order to fully realize the right. In many cases,
denying the presence ofa union representative
if one is available may effectively render tbe
Weingarten right a right to the presence, and
not the assistance, ofa representative. A reqtiest
for a union representative that does not canse
unreasonable delay should be protected and
honored where one is available, even if it may
not be the official representative of the employee. Clearly, however, since the employer
has no obligation to bargain with the certified
representative in the unionized setting, there is
no obligation to bargain with the uncertified
representative in the nonunionized setting.
Employee waiver

It is clear from Weingarten that an employee may
forego the representation right at the time of the
interview by either failing to request a representative or deciding to proceed without a represen-
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tative when tlie alternative is to relinquish the
opportunity for the inteiTiew. Tlie Supreme Court
has held that the Weingaiien right senses to protect the exercise ofthe flill fieedoni of association
and self-organization for the purpose of muaial
aid and protection—what the Court teiTned the
mostflindamental ptupose ofthe NLRA.*^ Even
though the Court found the existence of the
WeingaHen right in the "mutual aid and protection" language of Section 7, lower courts have interpreted the right as an individual right. The
Fifth Circuit found the Weingarten right to be an
individualrightbased on the fact tiiat an employee
may waive the right by not invoking it, and held
that a union may contractually waive the
Weingarten right. ^•' The Board subseqtiently
agreed that the union could waive the right. ^"
After Epilepsy Foundation, it is questionable
whedier an unrepresented employee may contractually waive Weingarten tights. The answer
to this question might depend on the interpretation ofthe right. Ifthe Fifth Circuit's interpretation were to prevail, then it would seem logical
that an employee could waive the Weingarten
right. Since the puipose ofthe right, as enunciated by the Supreme Court, is the protection of
the employee's right to mutual aid and protection, die answer is uncertain. Although the Court
has held tliat a union may waive individual rights,
it may do so because the employees have had
the opportunity to join together and organize a
union for the purpose of mutual aid and protection. In other words, the purpose of Weingarten
has been realized at the time of the waiver. The
situation is completely different for tbe unrepresented employee. There is no tinion and thus
no organization for mutual aid and protection.
The WeingaHen right is a means for the nonmiion
employee to realize the protections of Section 7.
Under this analysis, because the employer cannot require an employee to waive the right to
Section 7 protection, it would seem that requiring an unrepresented employee to waive
Weingaiten rights would be prohibited as well.
Pay for the representative

In the unionized workplace, the collective bargaining agreement usually will address whether
LABOR LAW JOURNAL

employees will be paid for time spent on union
ludoii of these issues. The employer would be
business and at w^hat rate. The agreement may
privileged to disclose potentially defamatoiy
also specify how employees will be relieved to
information to the union in its role as repreperform union business to minimize disruption
sentative ofthe employee in the interview. In
of work. In the nonunion context, no collecaddition, the union has a duty to represent any
tively-bargained agreeother employees in the
ment exists to deal with
bargaining unit who
such issues. To avoid
W H I L E T H E ABSENCE
might be discussed in
the question, the emtbe intei^iew. Because
OF
A
U
N
I
O
N
MAY
L
I
M
I
T
ployer may schedule die
of this duty, as well as
inten'iew after work or
tlie democratic realities
THE EMPLOYEE'S KNOWLEDGE
at another time that
of holding union office,
REGARDING THE EMPLOYER'S
would be unpaid and
union representatives
limit work disruption.
have an incentive to use
DISCIPLINARY HISTORY,
Alternatively, the safest
information learned in
A
N
Y
EXISTING
KNOWLEDGE
course is for the emthe investigation only
ployei' to follow any exas necessaiy in their
WILL DETERMINE WHETHER
isting practice regardrepresentative role. A
THE EMPLOYEE'S BELIEF
ing scheduling and paycoworker may have no
ment for similar activisuch incentive. Further,
WAS REASONABLE.
ties. Any differential
one of the reasons for
the holding in Epilepsy
treatment for concerted
activity would certainly lead to an argument that
Foundation is that a coworker representative
tlie employee was being penalized for engagmay help protect against unfair discipline. To
ing in activity protected by the statute. For exsen'e that purpose, the representative will necample, the disciplinaiy interview might be
essarily need to discuss the facts underlying
analogized to other work-related meetings.
the disciphne with others.
Since the employee's presence is being reThe right to representation as enunciated
quested by a co-employee rather than the emin Fpilepsy Foundation, would seem to provide
ployer, the employer might plausibly contend
the employer with several defenses to any
that it is not obliged to pay the co-employee for
defamation claim. The privilege to commtitime spent attending the meeting. The cost of
nicate information should extend to the copaying the co-employee for attending the inworker representative by virtue of the decitewiew during work time, however, particularly
sion. Since the privilege can be lost if the
where the time can be determined by the ememployer acts with reckless disregard for the
ployer, seems a small price to pay for avoiding
truth or falsity ofthe statements, the employer
what could be a protracted legal dispute.
should always be cautious with respect to the
reliability of information that forms the basis
Defamation
of an investigation. Caution is necessary reTwo potentially more difficult and somewhat
gardless of Epilepsy Foundation, however, for
intertwined issues are the confidentiality ofthe
any disciplinary action taken by the employer
information revealed in the intei-view and the
and communicated to anyone poses a risk of
risk of defamation claims. An investigatoiy
a defamation action if the privilege is lost.
interview is likely to involve discussion of alFpilepsy Foundation simply adds one additional
legedly improper, if not illegal, actions by the
person to whom the communication is made.
employee, which would damage his or ber
Another possible argument should a defamareputation. Where the representative is from
tion issue arise, at least with respect to the
the certified union, the union's role eases resoemployee that is being investigated, is that
WEINGARTEN RIGHTS IN NONUNION SETTINGS
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the representative is an agent ofthe employee
and thus there has been no publication.
Confidentiality

The sensitive nature of any disciplinary inquiry gives rise to concerns about confidentiality, both for the employee who is the subject of the investigatory interview and others who might be discussed dtiring the interview. The most problematic issue involves
investigation of sexual harassment claims.
An employee concerned about confidentiality of any acctisations may simply refrain
from requesting a representative or choosing a trustworthy coworker An employer
concerned about confidentiality may forego
the interview ifthe employee insists on representation. That may not be a realistic
option for an employer faced with a sexual
harassment allegation. Ifthe harasser and
subject of the interview is a supervisor, no
Weingarten right attaches to the interview as
supervisors are not covered by the NLRA,
but if the accused harasser is an employee,
he has a Weingarten right in an investigatory
interview if he reasonably believes that it
might result in disciplinary action. Since the
employer may be liable under Title VII for
sexual harassment by a coworker if the employer knew about the harassment and failed
to take appropriate remedial action, an accusation of harassment will trigger an obligation to investigate.
The confidentiality at greatest risk is that
of the victim of the harassment. Employees
who are sexually harassed frequently are reluctant to report the harassment. The necessary presence of a representative for the accused may exacerbate tbe already existing fear
that the allegations may become the subject
of office gossip and, thus, discourage reporting even further. And unlike the union representative in that situation, tbe coworker representative is not constrained by any legal or
political representational duties.
The employer could certainly encourage
the representative to be discreet, but any express restrictions on disclosure may impede
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the objectives ofthe Weingarten right, as discussion may be necessary to determine
whether discipline was warranted and fairly
meted out. At most, however, the addition
ofthe representative gives knowledge about
the investigation to an additional person who
may breach confidentiality. Currently, nothing prevents the acctised from disclosing the
accusations of harassnient, except his own
desire for privacy. A union representative
could also disclose such information without
legal ramifications unless the representative
owed a duty to the victim as a member of
the same bargaining unit and the publication established arbitraiy^ or discriminatory
treatment of the victim. Nevertheless, the
inhibiting effect of additional exposure
might warrant Board approval ofa requirement that the representative agree not to disclose anything learned in the course ofthe
meeting unless it was necessary to assist the
accused in his defense. While such an agreement might lead to additional litigation, it
seems warranted to accommodate the Title
VII interest in eliminating sexual harassnient
with the Section 7 right to make common
catise with coworkers to avoid arbitrary and
unfair employer treatment.
CONCLUSION

Since the NLRB's decision in Fpilepsy Foundation, the presidential election has resulted in
another significant change in Board membership. Civen prior shifts in the law regarding
nonunion employee representation rights, another change may be in the offing. If not, when
applying Fpilepsy Foundation, the Board should
consider the distortions in the mirror when
Weingarten rights are applied in the nonunion
sector. To enstire that the decision accomplishes its purpose of providing nonunion
employees with assistance in an interview and
protecting employees from unjust discipline
without intixiding unnecessarily on management prerogatives, the Board must modify the
doctrine to take into account the differences
between union and nonunion workplaces. •
LABOR LAW JOURNAL
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